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Abstract: European football is undergoing rapid changes spurred on by
enormous investments from around the globe. Although regulations exist to
curtail teams buying their way to success, foreign investors have become
ingenious at circumventing Financial Fair Play rules. The European
football governing body needs to reevaluate existing rules and strengthen
them by looking to outside examples. This article analyzes the current
regulations established by the governing bodies of European football and
details how foreign investors are able to circumvent these regulations.
Further, this article articulates potential solutions to the current Financial
Fair Play rules and how the spirit of the current rules can be ultimately
realized.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of UEFA’s1 Financial Fair Play (FFP)
regulations, European football2 has seen remarkable growth in revenue and
profitability.3 As profitability and popularity continue to grow, so does
outside interest in European football. For example, in 2015, American
broadcasting company NBC spent $1 billion to secure broadcasting rights to
the English Premier League until the 2021/2022 season.4 This broadcasting
deal represents just one of Europe’s five main leagues. While most European
countries have their own football league, the five most successful leagues
come from Spain, England, Italy, Germany, and France.5
With the increasing popularity of European football, there has been a
growth of foreign investment into different European clubs.6 Since 2004,
UEFA football clubs have seen record high investments coming from outside
Europe.7 There are forty-four clubs in major European leagues that are under
foreign ownership.8 Through these investment, foreign owners are looking to
cash in on the modern popularity of UEFA football.9 With the introduction
of FFP, top clubs welcomed additional foreign investments to continue their
race to the top.10
An integral part of becoming one of the most successful clubs in Europe
involves acquiring top talent. Talent acquisition takes place during periods
referred to as transfer windows.11 There are two transfer windows each year
each giving teams opportunities to acquire new talent.12 During a transfer
window, European clubs spend large amounts of money acquiring new

1

Union of the European Football Association.
Since this paper will be discussing soccer in Europe, the article will refer to ‘soccer’ as
‘football.’ Additionally, ‘soccer teams’ will be referred to as ‘football clubs.’
3
THE UNION OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL ASS’N, THE EUROPEAN CLUB FOOTBALL
LANDSCAPE: CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARK REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015)[hereinafter
UEFA 2015 REPORT].
4
Richard Sandomir, NBC Retains Rights to Premier League in Six-Year Deal, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/sports/soccer/nbcretains-rights-to-premier-league-in-six-year-deal.html.
5
See
UEFA
rankings
for
club
competitions,
UEFA,
https://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/country (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
6
Repucom, Emerging Giants 5 (2015).
7
See id.; see also UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 56.
8
UEFA 2015 report, supra note 3, at 53.
9
Repucom, supra note 6.
10 Uefa says financial fair play has changed to attract new investors, THE GUARDIAN
(June 29, 2015 4:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/29/uefa-financialfair-play-investors.
11 FIFA, REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2003),
HTTPS://WWW.FIFA.COM/MM/DOCUMENT/AFFEDERATION/ADMINISTRATION/REGULATIONS_ON_T
HE_STATUS_AND_TRANSFER_OF_PLAYERS_EN_33410.PDF.
12 Id.
2
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talent.13 During the 2017 Summer transfer window, the English Premier
League alone spent £1.4 billion, the most it had spent in a single transfer
window.14 It goes without saying, the more money a club is able to spend on
players, the more successful it will be.
A profound example of a club spending big to reach the top is the recent
success Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) has enjoyed on the pitch15 and in the
transfer market.16 PSG, as recently as Summer of 2017, spent €222 million,
a record amount, on one player: Neymar from FC Barcelona.17 PSG spent
this level of money, through revenues never before seen until their new
foreign owners, to portray PSG as the top clubs in the world.18 While this
level of spending helped a club like PSG; some in their pursuit for European
success have found themselves in deep financial trouble.19 The trouble many
European clubs found themselves in, due to irresponsible spending, led to the
creation of FFP.20
In the three years prior to the creation of FFP, UEFA clubs were, on
average, operating with net operating losses.21 Evidenced through the record
breaking losses prior to FFP, frivolous spending in a race to the top became
the norm for some clubs.22 Since the implementation of FFP, European clubs
continue to post positive revenues.23 FFP sought to incite discipline and
rationality in UEFA clubs spending.24 UEFA, through FFP, sought to bring

13 See generally Premier League Clubs spend £1.4bn to break summer transfer record,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
1,
2017
6:03
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/sep/01/transfer-window-deadline-day-recordspend#img-1 (discussing the spending of the top five European leagues. Three out of five of
the top leagues spent over a billion pounds in the summer of 2017).
14 Id.
15 Pitch is the term used in Europe for soccer field. This paper will refer to a ‘soccer field’
as a ‘pitch.’
16 See Jason Burt, Exclusive: Nasser Al-Khelaifi reveals how Neymar and Mbappe can
help PSG take on the world, THE TELEGRAPGH (Sept. 11, 2017 4:34 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/2017/09/11/exclusive-nasser-al-khelaifi-revealsneymar-mbappe-can-help/ (interview with PSG’s Qatari owner discussing how the record
breaking spending by a club on one player, Neymar, will help the club reach the top and
challenge for the top spot of all their respective competitions).
17
Id.
18 Id.
19 See Graham Spiers, How the mighty Glasgow Rangers have fallen, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 18, 2015 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jan/18/how-themighty-glasgow-rangers-have-fallen.
20 See UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, EDITION 2015
art. 2 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 FFP].
21 UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 107 (UEFA clubs, in aggregate, took losses of
€249 million, €336 million, and €382 million in 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively).
22 See id.; see also 2015 FFP, supra note 20.
23 Id.
24 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 2(1)(c).
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club spending in line with their expenses through the break-even analysis.25
With the increase in foreign investment,26 clubs and their new foreign
owners have found creative ways to get around FFP.27 Rich foreign
benefactors found ingenious ways to use their incredible wealth to help their
newly acquired clubs race to the top through the purchase of new talent.28
One must ask, have the regulations found in FFP truly been as effective as
UEFA hoped? It is now apparent that FFP curbed irresponsible spending in
some regard; but are some clubs losing more than others because of FFP?
This paper will explore whether FFP allowed foreign investors to pick
winners and loser through the increase of their investments.
The paper proceeds by first examining the rise of foreign money in
European football in Section II. This section will explore the beginnings of
foreign investments and what the investments look like. Next, in Section III,
this paper will review FFP regulations and how they are currently managing
the financial landscape of European football. Section III will look at the
history and objectives of FFP, how FFP has affected the game so far, and
how FFP interacts with current European law. In Section IV, this paper will
explore how foreign investors and owners are able to circumvent the rules of
FFP, and how clubs are undercutting the spirit of FFP through the use of
foreign investments. Section V of this paper will identify and posit
recommendations of how to amend FFP to ensure the objectives FFP sought
to accomplish come to fruition while continuing the competitive nature of
European football that has captured the hearts of so many around the world.
Last, this paper will conclude with the current outlook of FFP and how it will
continue to affect the game.
II. THE RISE OF FOREIGN MONEY
A. The Origin of Foreign Money
The largest share of foreign owners in Europe come from Asian
25

2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 57.
Repucom, supra note 6, at 3.
27 See Jack Pitt-Brooke, Arsene Wenger hits out against FFP as Arsenal manager’s
patience
runs
thin,
THE INDEPENDENT (Sept.
7,
2017
10:01
PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/arsenal-latest-arsene-wengerscrap-ffp-patience-runs-thin-a7935291.html (one of the top football club managers in Europe
discussing how larger clubs use smaller “bridge” clubs to buy players using the smaller club
revenue stream then transfer the purchased player to the larger club, completely circumventing
FFP legally).
28 See Mark Ogden, Paris Saint-Germain sponsorship deal eclipse all rivals but opens
questions about Financial Fair Play regulations, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2013 12:58 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/european/10443730/Paris-Saint-Germainsponsorship-deal-eclipses-all-rivals-but-opens-questions-about-Financial-Fair-Playregulations.html (discussing PSG foreign owners funneling their wealth into the club through
a sponsorship deal to increase revenues allowing PSG greater room to spend in the transfer
market).
26
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countries.29 But this is a recent trend.30 The Russian purchase of Chelsea F.C.
marks the beginning of the influx of foreign owners.31 On July 1, 2003,
Russian businessman Roman Abramovich purchased Chelsea F.C., clearing
all debts from the club while making the largest purchase of new players any
English club had seen up to that point.32 The purchase of Chelsea F.C. is the
first example of a foreign owner using his own wealth to shape a team to
compete for top accolades.33 To date, Mr. Abramovich has spent over a £1
billion on the football club in their pursuit to the top of the football world.34
The success seen at Chelsea F.C. is what many foreign investors seek to
replicate. The second largest group of foreign owners in Europe are from
North America.35 With thirteen out of twenty clubs in the English Premier
League owned by foreign investors, Americans own six of those clubs.36 The
most popular example of a European club owned by American owners is
Manchester United after their purchase by the Glazer family.37 This was one
of the more controversial purchases of a European football club by foreign
ownership.38
The smallest foreign owner group in European football comes from the
Middle East;39 but while maintaining the smallest ownership share, they have
made a sizable impact.40 Middle Eastern ownership accounts for four clubs
throughout Europe which are located in different leagues in Europe.41 From

29

UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 55.
Id.
31 Id.; see also Chelsea, Club History, https://www.chelseafc.com/the-club/clubhistory/2000.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
32 Chelsea, Club History, https://www.chelseafc.com/the-club/club-history/2000.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2017); Jeremy Wilson, How Chelsea Owner Roman Abramovich changed
the face of football in England, THE TELEGRAPH (June 29, 2016 8:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/chelsea/10149386/How-Chelsea-ownerRoman-Abramovich-changed-the-face-of-football-in-England.html
(discussing
Mr.
Abramovich’s £140 million purchase of Chelsea with an additional £100 million spent on new
players the same year).
33 See Jeremy Wilson, supra note 32.
34 See id. Chelsea did finally reach the pinnacle of European football in 2012 when they
won the UEFA Champion’s League crowning them champions of Europe.
35 UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 55.
36 Id.
37 Martin Domin, Glazer family float more of club in New York, DAILY MIRROR (Aug. 10,
2017 2:27 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/manchester-united-owners-sell-56m10963970.
38 See id. (discussing fan disapproval in the America Owner’s taking assets out of the club
while neglecting infuse money into the club).
39 UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, 55.
40 See Repucom, supra note 6, at 3.
41 See UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 55 (discussing Middle Eastern ownership in
the English Premier League, the English Championship League, French League 1, and Spain’s
La Liga).
30
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the introduction of Middle Eastern investments in 200742 to 2014, Middle
Eastern ownership has invested $1.5 billion in club activities.43 The two most
notable teams under Middle Eastern ownership that experienced meteoric
rise since the introduction of foreign investments are Manchester City and
PSG. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) royal family purchased Manchester City F.C.44 Sheikh Mansour
purchased ninety percent ownership in Manchester City for £210 million in
2008;45 he quickly purchased the remaining ten percent a year later. Because
Manchester City had new Middle Eastern ownership, they were able to
secure a lucrative ten-year deal with UAE airline Etihad worth around £80
million a year.46 In 2015, seven years after the purchase of Manchester City,
many believed the club’s value was around £3 billion.47
Qatar Sports Investment’s (QSI)48 purchase of Paris Saint-Germaine
F.C. (hereinafter ‘PSG’), believed to be valued around $130 million, was
another prominent Middle Eastern acquisition.49 QSI is the sports division of
the Qatar Investment Authority, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund.50 During
QSI’s six-year ownership of PSG, a commenter estimates that PSG have
spent a total of over €905 million on new players alone.51
European football has seen vast amount of foreign capital invested into
different clubs and there are no indications of the investments slowing.52 In
42 See Repucom, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing a $250 million investment from Iranian
owners into Arsenal F.C.).
43 Id.
44 David Conn, Last shares give Sheikh Mansour total control of Manchester City, THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
22,
2009
7:10
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2009/sep/23/manchester-city-takeover.
45 Id.
46 Simon Mullock, Manchester City’s new £80-million-per-year sponsorship deal will
bank them nearly DOUBLE that of rivals United, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 7, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/manchester-citys-new-80million-per-yearsponsorship-5290985 (discussing Manchester City negotiating a new deal from their current
sponsor Etihad to make them one of the highest paid teams in terms of sponsorship in the
English Premier League); see also Beatrice Thomas, Arabtec Signs 3yr Man City Sponsorship
Deal, ARABIAN BUSINESS (May 15, 2014 9:54 AM).
47 Jamie Jackson, Manchester City owners announce £265 million deal with Chinese
investors,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
1,
2015,
5:14
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/01/manchester-city-265m-deal-chineseinvestment-group (discussing an investment in Manchester City by a Chinese investor totaling
£265 million, which as of 2015 accounted for thirteen percent of the club).
48 Qataris
complete PSG buyout, EUROSPORT (June 3, 2012, 4:32 PM),
http://www.eurosport.com/football/ligue-1/2011-2012/qatar-completes-psgbuyout_sto3182939/story.shtml [hereinafter PSG buyout].
49
Repucom, supra note 6, at 7.
50 PSG buyout, supra note 48.
51 Rob Bairner, Neymar to PSG: how much have Qatar owners spent on transfers since
2011 takeover?, GOAL (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:51 AM), http://www.goal.com/en/news/neymar-topsg-how-much-have-qatar-owners-spent-on-transfers/1kpoa9c2p4mpw1vjorclin0tm9.
52 See generally UEFA 2015 report, supra note 3, at 53 (discussing 2016 was the most

65

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

39:59 (2018)

2016, European football saw the highest activity of foreign takeovers which
included ten new takeovers, eight of which were Chinese owners.53 In 2016
alone, Chinese investors became principal owners in three English clubs:
Aston Villa, Wolverhampton Wanderers, and West Bromwich Albion.54
B. The Structure of Foreign Investments
Mirroring the rise in European football popularity, the methods foreign
investors use to invest in the sport are expanding.55 Foreign investment goes
beyond just purchasing a club. Investments into this lucrative pastime also
include club sponsorships,56 player sponsorships,57 and different media
rights.58 While there do remain many ways for foreign investors to maintain
a stake in the sport, club ownership remains the most lucrative and appealing.
When it comes to club structures, some operate as publicly traded
companies while other remain closely held private companies.59 Depending
on the structure of the club, the methods a foreign investor will go about
purchasing the club will differ. Take for example the publicly traded club
Manchester United and their buyout by foreign investors from the United
States. The American Glazer family famously, or perhaps infamously,
acquired 98% of the stock of English football club Manchester United.60 The
buyout began in March of 2003 when the Glazer family purchased 2.9% of
Manchester United’s publicly traded shares for approximately £9 million.61
active for foreign acquisition to date).
53 Id.
54 Sam Wallace, Great haul of China is changing European football and up to 30 more
billionaires are looking to invest in clubs, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:02 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/2016/09/07/great-haul-of-china-is-changing-europeanfootball-and-up-to-30-m/.
55 Repucom, supra note 6, at 5-6.
56 Id. (discussing the top twenty clubs in Europe now feature some type of sponsorship
from a middle eastern company).
57 See R.J.E., Why Neymar is different, THE ECONOMIST (AUG. 9, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2017/08/football-transfers (discussing Qatar,
after signing Neymar to PSG, are looking into making Neymar the ambassador of the 2022
Qatar world cup).
58 Repucom, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing Qatar’s media company Al Jazeera, through
the subsidiary BeIN, purchasing the media rights to all English Premier League games in the
Middle East market, additionally, BeIN holding all rights to UEFA Champion League games
in Southern Asia).
59 See generally Vikram Barhat, Love sports? Buy your own team–or part of one, BBC
(June 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20140610-love-sports-buy-a-team
(discussing how some clubs, like Manchester United, are traded publicly and club ownership
is open to anyone who can buy one or more share but also looking at how the purchase of
privately held clubs are purchased in a “word of mouth” sort of market).
60 See Glazer gets 98% of Man Utd shares, BBC (June 28, 2005, 10:29 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4629401.stm.
61 Super Bowl hero takes slice of Man Utd, BBC (Mar. 2, 2003, 6:37 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2813439.stm.
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By October of 2004, the Glazer family owned nearly 30% of Manchester
United public shares and then began officially putting together a bid to
acquire the club in totality.62 In April 2005, the Glazers readied an £800
million bid to buyout Manchester United entirely.63
The purchase structure of a privately held club will differ from that of a
publicly traded club.64 After two years of negotiation, culminating in 2017,
Italian owners sold AC Milan, one of the most prolific teams in Italian
football, to foreign investors.65 The purchase of AC Milan from the former
Italian owner cost the new Chinese owners an estimated €740 million.66 The
new owners used a Luxembourg-based company by the name of Rossoneri
Sport Investment Lux to buy AC Milan.67 Yonghong Li controls the new
Luxembourg company, but the overall ownership structure of this newly
created company has yet to be revealed.68
Yonhhon Li’s and Han Li’s takeover of AC Milan is an example that
foreign investments can be based on considerations other than mere club
acquisitions. Representatives of the Chinese investors revealed the day after
the club acquisition they had begun looking into purchasing a new stadium.69
The new owners, currently renting AC Milan’s home stadium, are looking
into acquiring a new stadium in an effort to have larger control over ticket
prices and other match-day revenue.70 In addition to the investment made by
the new investors in purchasing the club and looking to buy a new stadium,
the new ownership team spent heavily in the transfer market in an effort to
drive up revenue.71 AC Milan, with the help of their new Chinese owners,
spent an estimated €151 million on new player before the start of the first
62

See Glazer gets 98% of Man Utd shares, supra note 60.
Id.
64 See generally Ben Gladwell, Silvio Berlusconi sells AC Milan to Chinese investors,
ESPN (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.espnfc.com/ac-milan/story/3102696/silvio-berlusconisells-ac-milan-to-chinese-investors (discussing the one-on-one negotiation between the seller
and buyer rather than the buyer acquiring shares through the open market as seen with the
Manchester United acquisition).
65 Id.
66 Id. (the €740 million purchase includes €220 million in liabilities currently held by the
club as well as €90 million in operating expenses that had been paid by the previous owner
which is set to be refunded).
67 Giulia Segreti & Elvira Pollina, New Chinese owners of Italy’s AC Milan soccer club
to invest in stadium: CEO, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2017, 5:12 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-acmilan-m-a-ceo/new-chinese-owners-of-italys-ac-milansoccer-club-to-invest-in-stadium-ceo-idUSKBN17G0SF.
68 Id.
69 Id. (discussing the Italian club looking to either build a new stadium or buy the stadium
they currently rent).
70 Id.
71 James Walker-Roberts, Will AC Milan challenge in Serie A again after ‘summer of
dreams’?,
SKY
SPORTS
(Aug.
01,
2017
1:50
PM),
http://www.skysports.com/football/news/11863/10959576/are-ac-milan-primed-tochallenge-in-serie-a-again-after-summer-of-dreams.
63
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season under the new owners.72
III. UEFA’S FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY RULES AND REGULATIONS
A. Origin of Financial Fair Play and the Objectives Behind It
UEFA signed and approved the FFP regulations in 2010 and they took
effect at the beginning of the 2011/2012 season of European football.73
Article two of the FFP regulations make it clear that the objective of enacting
FFP rules was to increase the integrity and longevity of the game. 74 UEFA
holds FFP was not meant to bring parity between small and large clubs, and
whether FFP made it harder for smaller clubs to compete was not an issue
they sought to address.75 FFP hurting smaller clubs chances against bigger
clubs is not synonymous to making all clubs equal in size. As stated by
several chairmen of larger football clubs, FFP has really hurt the
competitiveness of smaller clubs.76 Bruce Buck of Chelsea F.C., stated “[t]he
problem with FFP in essence is it goes a long way to preserving the status
quo.”77 Mr. Buck also added “[o]ne of the great things about football in this
country, and many others, is if you are last in [a lower league] you can still
hope one day you will be in the Premier League. That is difficult, if not
impossible, with FFP.”78
FFP states its objective is to improve the standard of all aspects of
European football; the aspect of competition it would appear has been left by
the wayside with these new regulations.79 The Chairman of Chelsea F.C. even
72

See id.
Financial
fair
play:
all
you
need
to
know,
UEFA.COM,
http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html(last updated Oct. 23, 2017)
[hereinafter FFP all you need to know].
74 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 2. Article 2 of FFP states the objectives are to: a) further
promote and improve the standard of all aspects of European football competitions; b) to
ensure adequate management of football clubs; c) to ensure the infrastructure of football clubs
are safe for all constituents; d) to ensure smooth running UEFA club competitions; and e) to
develop financial benchmarks for clubs regarding their financial strength. Additionally, article
2 of UEFA’s FFP set out the objectives, specifically aimed at UEFA competitions, that set out
to: a) increase the transparency and credibility of club’s financials; b) increase protection of
club creditors; c) increase discipline and rationality in club spending; d) encourage clubs to
spend within their means; e) encourage responsible spending to increase longevity of football
clubs; f) to protect the longevity of European football.
75 FFP all you need to know, supra note 73.
76 Glenn Moore, Financial Fair Play policy unfair on smaller clubs claim chairmen of
Chelsea
and
Southampton,
INDEPENDENT (Oct.
10,
2013
2:54
PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/financial-fair-play-policyunfair-on-smaller-clubs-claim-chairmen-of-chelsea-and-southampton-8872161.html.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See id.(discussing Southampton’s difficulty in closing the financial gap between them
and larger clubs making it harder to compete. The chairman of Southampton discussed the
fact they may need to start focusing on developing youth players that could be sold to larger
73
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hinted that foreign investments may be partly responsible for the disparity
between the competitiveness of smaller clubs and larger clubs.80 Mr. Buck
alluded to the fact that third-party sponsorship deals may potentially be useful
to boost the revenue of clubs, allowing them to spend big while staying
within FFP.81 Third-party sponsorship deals are exactly one type of financial
investment used by foreign owners to pick winners and losers in European
football.82
UEFA released FFP in 2011 but those rules are no longer in effect today;
UEFA updated FFP in 2015.83 Using the input of many constituents of the
FFP regulation, UEFA spent nearly two years developing the updated
regulations.84 UEFA intended FFP’s new changes to take into account clubs
who have recently gone through an “economic shock” and give them some
leeway.85 Additionally, the new 2015 FFP regulations will exclude
expenditures for youth and women’s football programs.86 The President of
UEFA stated that even though the FFP regulations have been updated, “the
overall objectives of [FFP] remain the same.”87 The previous General
Secretary of UEFA, Gianni Infantino, explained he hopes that the new FFP
revisions will serve to entice new investors in European football.88
B. The Current Iteration of Financial Fair Play
UEFA entrusts the enforcement of their FFP rules to the Club Financial
Control Body (CFCB).89 The CFCB has two chambers, both of which answer
to the CFCB chairman.90 First, the investigatory chamber has the task of
clubs to remain commercially viable since they will not be able to compete on the pitch).
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See Mullock, supra note 46 (discussing third-party sponsorship of Manchester City
allowing them to spend large amount of money in the transfer window acquiring better
players).
83 2015 FFP, supra note 20; see also FFP all you need to know, supra note 73.
84 Club
Licensing
and
FFP
Regulations
approved,
UEFA.COM,
http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/executivecommittee/news/newsid=2262293.html (last updated Feb. 13, 2017)[hereinafter FFP
updated].
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. (discussing UEFA, in updating the regulations, are moving from a time of austerity
to a period where UEFA can offer more chances for club development and sustainable
growth).
88 Uefa says financial fair play has changed to attract new investors, THE GUARDIAN
(June 29, 2015 6:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/29/uefa-financialfair-play-investors (“We are sure that these new rules will encourage investors to invest in
European football because European football is the best product in the world when it comes
to club football”).
89 PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB FINANCIAL CONTROL BODY, art. 3
(2015).
90 Id. art. 4.
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monitoring clubs and investigating potential wrong-doings91 Second, the
adjudicatory chamber oversees the judgment stage of any proceedings.92 The
CFCB chief investigator heads the investigatory chamber and the CFCB
chairman heads the adjudicatory chamber.93 There cannot be a member in
either chamber that also serves in the other chamber.94
Should the CFCB find that a club violated the FFP, they have many
options available to them in disciplining the club.95 The potential disciplinary
measures available to the CFCB range from a warning to the withdrawal of
a club’s previously won trophy.96 While there is a wide range of potential
punishments, the CFCB prefers settlements with clubs rather than harsher
punitive punishments.97 Settlement agreements offered by the CFCB may set
out objectives, with timelines, clubs must meet.98 If a club is able to complete
stated objectives in its settlement agreement ahead of schedule, the CFCB
can amend the remaining objectives within the settlement agreement if the
offending club makes a reasoned request.99
The first iteration of the FFP mainly sought to ensure clubs did not have
any overdue payables.100 UEFA introduced the break-even analysis which
looks to balance club spending with their revenue and looks to curb clubs
accumulating debt.101 The break-even analysis is set out in article fifty-eight
through sixty-four of UEFA’s FFP regulations.102 Any club that wishes to
participate in UEFA-sanctioned competitions must comply with the FFP
break-even analysis.103
Article fifty-eight of FFP outlines streams of revenue and club expenses

91

Id.
Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. art 29(1).
96 Id. (Article 29(1) outlines nine different potential disciplinary actions for clubs
including: a) warning; b) reprimand; c) fine; d) deduction of points; e) withholding of revenue
from UEFA competition; f) prohibiting the registration of new players; g) restriction on
number of players a club can use in a UEFA competition; h) disqualification from UEFA
competition; and i) withdrawal of UEFA title or award).
97 See FFP all you need to know, supra note 73 (discussing UEFA prefers to take a
rehabilitative approach rather than a punitive approach with breaching clubs, providing a
roadmap for clubs to reach break-even in the future); see generally PROCEDURAL RULES
GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB FINANCIAL CONTROL BODY art. 15.
98 See PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB FINANCIAL CONTROL BODY,
supra note 89, art. 15(1) (2015); see also FFP all you need to know, supra note 73.
99 PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB FINANCIAL CONTROL BODY, supra
note 89, art. 15(1).
100 FFP all you need to know, supra note 73.
101 Id.
102 2015 FFP, supra note 20, arts. 58-64.
103 Id. art. 57(1).
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that are to be evaluated under the break-even analysis.104 FFP, in article fiftyeight, also outlines that income and expenses from “related parties” must be
adjusted to reflect fair market value.105 FFP defines “related parties” to
include individually related parties and legal entities.106 Due to the demand
of European football, clubs can feel enticed to inflate the value of revenue
received from a related party;107 thus, the need for UEFA’s stipulation that
revenue from a related party needs to reflect a fair market value. What some
clubs attempt to do through related party revenue is conceal equity
contributions to the club as legitimate payment for services.108 The difficulty
for UEFA is determining what percentage of a related party payment, if any,
is an equity contribution rather than payment for services rendered.109
There are three reporting periods outlined in Article fifty-nine of FFP
which a club will be assessed under.110 The first reporting period under the
break-even analysis, known as reporting period T, is the ending of the
calendar year that the UEFA competition begins.111 The second reporting
period, referred to as T-1, is the year prior to T.112 The last reporting period,
referred to as T-2, is the year prior to T-1.113 For example, if UEFA is
evaluating the break-even analysis for a club during the 2017/2018 season,
the analysis would cover the reporting periods ending in 2017 (T), 2016 (T1), and 2015 (T-2).114
Article sixty of FFP, referred to as the “notion of break-even results,”
discusses what exactly the break-even analysis evaluates.115 The break-even
analysis looks at the revenues earned by the club and expenses paid by the
club to determine if the club is operating in a deficit or surplus.116 The CFCB
104 Id. art. 58(1) (Annex X of UEFA’S FFP discusses revenues such as: a) gate receipts; b)
sponsorship and advertising; c) broadcasting rights; d) commercial activity; e) UEFA prize
money; and f) other operating income all count in the break-even analysis. As for expenses,
the break-even analysis takes into consideration: a) cost of sales/materials; b) employee
benefits; c) other operating expenses).
105 Id. art. 58(3).
106 Id. annex X(F)(1) (defining related party as a person or entity that is related to the entity
that is preparing its financial statements. In considering each possible related party
relationship, UEFA looks to the substance of the relationship and not merely the legal form).
107 Salvatore Cincimino, Revenues from related Parties Transactions and UEFA Financial
Fair Play. The Search for an Alternative Solution to Fair Value Measurement for the Breakeven Result Assessment, 1 ATHENS J. SPORTS 103, 104 (JUN. 2014).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 59.
111 Id. art. 59(a).
112 Id. art. 59(b).
113 Id. art. 59(c).
114 Id. art. 59.
115 Id. art. 60.
116 Id. art. 60 (the terms ‘revenue’ and ‘surplus’ are defined in Annex X of FFP
regulations).
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will inquire into whether a club has a surplus or deficit for each reporting
period (T, T-1, and T-2).117 If all three reporting periods total zero or more,
UEFA will judge the club to have a break-even surplus.118 However, if the
amount between all three reporting periods is less than zero, UEFA will find
the club will to have a break-even deficit.119 Moreover, if a club does have a
break-even deficit over the three reporting periods, they can point to a surplus
in two previous reporting periods (T-3 and T-4) in an attempt to reduce their
deficit.120
While UEFA looks to ensure clubs are not spending beyond their
means, they do allow slight deviation for clubs when it comes to the breakeven analysis.121 Article sixty-one provides allowable deviations. UEFA
allows clubs to deviate from the break-even analysis by amounts up to €5
million.122 However, if the club has an equity owner or a related party making
contributions to the club, the club is allowed a deviation of €30 million.123
Allowing a deviation of €30 million if capital contributions are present from
equity owners or related parties is a reduction from the €45 million that the
2012 version of FFP regulations allowed.124
The rest of the articles in the FFP regulations that make up the breakeven analysis (sixty-two through sixty-four) detail what information the club
must provide and when.125 FFP details clubs whom operate a deficit in either
T, T-1, or T-2 must submit projected financials for the upcoming fiscal year
indicating their financials are moving in the right direction.126
C. Application of the Break-Even Analysis
UEFA has issued fifty-four settlements or adjudications since the
introduction of the break-even analysis for club with varying degrees of FFP
breaches.127 A little over half of the disciplinary action taken by the CFCB
for breach of FFP have been the CFCB settling with clubs over their FFP
breach.128 Out of the fifty-four disciplinary actions taken by the CFCB, some
of them have garnered more media attention than others. These cases
illuminate the application of FFP best due to the visibility of not only the
117

Id.
Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. art. 61.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, EDITION 2012 art. 61
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 FFP].
125 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 62.
126 See id. art. 64.
127 See supra note 73.
128 See id. (listing all fifty-four CFCB decisions, twenty-eight out of fifty-four, or fifty-one
percent, were settlements between the breaching club and CFCB).
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infractions of the club, but the results of the penalties faced by the clubs.
One of the most recent decisions by the CFCB against a club was the
settlement agreement reached between the CFCB and the storied Portuguese
club FC Porto.129 UEFA found FC Porto in breach of the monitoring
requirements found in articles fifty-three through sixty-eight, particularly the
break-even analysis found in articles fifty-eight to sixty-four.130 The two
years prior to CFCB disciplinary action, FC Porto had net operating losses of
€48,614,000 and €16,745,000 respectively.131 FC Porto had taken steps to
bring the club within the requirements of the break-even analysis;
consequently FC Porto was able to present a comprehensive business plan to
the CFCB investigators.132 Because FC Porto presented their plan, the CFCB,
per article fifteen of the procedure rules governing the CFCB, found a
settlement agreement an acceptable outcome in this case.133
The settlement agreement requires FC Porto to satisfy the break-even
analysis by monitoring periods for 2018, 2019, and 2020.134 Additionally, FC
Porto agrees to forfeit €700,000 of their winnings for their participation in
the 2016/2017 UEFA Champions League competition.135 If FC Porto fails to
adhere to the break-even analysis for 2018, 2019, or 2020 outlined in the
settlement agreement, they will forfeit an additional €1,500,000 from their
2016/2017 UEFA champions league winnings.136 In addition to FC Porto’s
monetary punishment, they were also subject to a sporting punishment as
well.137 FC Porto had the maximum number of registrable players they can
register for UEFA Champions League competition reduced for each year of
the settlement monitoring period.138
During 2014, the first year CFCB discipline took place after the
129

See UEFA Club Licensing & Financial Fair Play Unit, Decision Of The Chief
Investigator Of The CFCB Investigatory Settlement Agreement With FUTEBOL CLUBE DO
PORTO–FUTEBOL, SAD (2017) [hereinafter FC Porto CFCB agreement]; see also History,
FC PORTO, http://www.fcporto.pt/en/clube/historia/Pages/historia.aspx (discussing FC Porto
is now, as of the end of the 2016/2017 season, the most winningest club hailing from Portugal).
130 FC Porto CFCB agreement, supra note 129, at 1.
131 Management Report & Consolidated Accounts 2015/2016 FC Porto Futebol SAD, FC
Porto SAD, http://www.fcporto.pt/Relatrios%20de%20Contas/RC_Consolidado_20152016_INGLES.pdf (showing a majority of the operational expense for the two reporting years
stemming from the purchasing of players and their salary).
132 FC Porto CFCB agreement, supra note 129, at 1.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2 (discussing FC Porto may not have a break-even analysis deviation of more
than €30 million at the end of the 2017 reporting period, €20 million at the end of the 2018
reporting period, and €10 million at the end of the 2019 reporting period).
135 Id. at 3.
136
Id.
137 Id. at 4.
138 Id. (discussing how FC Porto may not register more than twenty-two players in the
2017/2018 season, twenty-three players in the 2018/2019 season, and twenty-three players for
the 2019/2020 season. Clubs are allowed to register twenty-five players for UEFA Champions
League competition if no reduction is in place).
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introduction of the FFP, two high-profile settlements occurred: one with
Manchester City and the other with PSG.139 Both settlements occurred on the
same day, May 16, 2014. Manchester City, for fiscal year 2011 and 2012,140
had net operating losses of £189,587,000 and £93,444,000 respectively;141
and in 2013, or reporting period T, Manchester City took a loss of
£44,753,000.142 PSG also took losses over the course of the reporting periods
applicable to their settlement.143 PSG’s losses stemmed mainly from UEFA
reevaluating a sponsorship agreement between PSG and Qatar Tourism
Authority (QTA).144 The CFCB found PSG had been above the allocated
deviation from the break-even analysis once the PSG/QTA sponsorship deal
was reevaluated.145
Additionally, both PSG and Manchester City faced similar penalties
under FFP in their settlement agreements with CFCB.146 Manchester City
agreed to pay UEFA a total of €60 million in fees, of which €40 million
would be returned to Manchester City if they fully comply with the
settlement agreement.147 The CFCB handed PSG the same monetary
penalty.148 Both clubs were prohibited from increasing their spending on
player salaries while also significantly reducing their spending on new
players for the next two years.149 Lastly, the CFCB required both clubs to
reduce their registered players for all UEFA competitions down to twenty-

139 UEFA, ARCHIVE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/
disciplinary/club-financial-controlling-body/cases/index.html (last updated June 13, 2018);
see also Keith Weir, PSG, Man City face squad caps, fines over FFP, REUTERS (MAY 6, 2014
5:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-uefa-ffp/psg-man-city-face-squadcaps-fines-over-ffp-idUKKBN0DM0LR20140506; Financial Fair Play: Manchester City
and PSG Punished, CNN (May 16, 2014 5:35 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/ 2014/05/16/sport/
football/financial-fair-play-uefa-football/index.html.
140 2011 would be considered “T-2” for purposes of the break-even analysis that was used
in determining Manchester City’s breach of FFP. 2012 would be “T-1” for the same analysis.
141 MANCHESTER CITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2011-2012, http://content.mcfc.co.uk/~/media/
Files/Annual%20Report/Annual%20report%201112%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter 2011-2012
Man City Report].
142 MANCHESTER CITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2012-2013, http://content.mcfc.co.uk/~/media/
Files/Annual%20Report/MCFC_AR.pdf, [hereinafter 2012-2013 Man City Report].
143 See UEFA CLUB LICENSING & FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY UNIT, DECISION OF THE CHIEF
INVESTIGATOR OF THE CFCB INVESTIGATORY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH PARIS SAINTGERMAIN FOOTBALL CLUB 1 (2014) [hereinafter PSG CFCB AGREEMENT].
144 Id.; see also infra section IV (discussing the question sponsorship deal as one
instrument used by PSG foreign owners attempting to circumvent FFP).
145 PSG CFCB AGREEMENT, supra note 143, at 1.
146
Id.; see UEFA CLUB LICENSING & FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY UNIT, DECISION OF THE CHIEF
INVESTIGATOR OF THE CFCB INVESTIGATORY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH MANCHESTER
CITY FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED (2014) [hereinafter MAN CITY CFCB AGREEMENT].
147 MAN CITY CFCB AGREEMENT, supra note 146, at 2.
148 PSG CFCB AGREEMENT, supra note 143, at 2.
149 Id. at 1; MAN CITY CFCB AGREEMENT, supra note 146, at 1.
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one players from the standard twenty-five players.150
FFP, while only being around for a few years, has already made a large
impact on the game. Revenue has increased and deficit spending has
decreased, ensuring clubs are spending responsibly.151 UEFA enacted FFP to
ensure fiscal responsibility in European clubs,152 however, some clubs have
found ways of getting around FFP in hopes of achieving victory on the largest
European stage.
IV. METHODS USED BY FOREIGN OWNERS TO AVOID
FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS.
The rationale behind FFP is to ensure clubs do not spend beyond their
means,153 but some clubs discovered ways to undercut the spirit of FFP while
technically remaining within the regulatory guidelines.154 UEFA requires,
per FFP article fifty-eight, relevant income and expenses from related parties
to be assessed at fair market value.155 The issue with related party income,
specifically when it comes from sponsorships, is it can be difficult to discern
what part, if any, of the revenue is truly intended to be a sponsorship payment
and what portion is equity contributions to the football club from the related
party.156
The realization that some clubs may attempt to obscure equity
contributions through related party “revenues” is not lost on UEFA.157 On at
least two occasions, UEFA called into questions revenue received from
related parties. One of those occasions occurred in connection to a
sponsorship deal the English club Manchester City entered into with the
airline Etihad.158 Both Etihad’s and Manchester City’s owners hail from the
UAE.159 The owner of Manchester City is a member of the royal family of

150 PSG CFCB AGREEMENT, supra note 143, at 1; MAN CITY CFCB AGREEMENT, supra note
146, at 1.
151 UEFA 2015 REPORT, supra note 3, at 106 (discussing European clubs’ net operating
losses have been reduced by eighty-one percent since the introduction of FFP).
152 Supra Section III.
153 Supra Section III.A (discussing the stated reasons for FFP—found in article 2 of the
FFP regulations).
154 See Jack Pitt-Brooke, supra note 27 (discussing comments made by a European club
manager discussing an entire country owning a football club amounts to “financial doping.”).
155 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 58.3.
156 Salvatore Cincimino, supra note 107, at 112.
157 See Daniel Taylor, Uefa to scrutinise Mancherster City’s sponsorship deal with Etihad,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2011 2:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
football/2011/aug/16/uefa-manchester-city-etihad (Jean-Luc Dehaene, chairman of the CFCB
stated “If we see clubs that are looking for loopholes we will act. It is not enough to say:
‘We’ve got a sponsorship contract and that’s OK’ if the contract is out of line”).
158 Id.
159 Matt Slater, Uefa boss to scrutinise Manchester City’s Etihad deal, BBC (Aug. 16,
2011), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/14490740.
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UAE while the owner of Etihad airlines is the UAE government.160
Manchester City and Etihad claimed they valued their sponsorship deal to be
worth around £400 million over ten years.161 In the two years prior to the
announcement of this sponsorship agreement, Manchester City posted
revenue of -£93 million and -£121 million respectively.162 UEFA made the
decision to investigate the sponsorship deal to ensure Manchester City was
not using the sponsorship deal to circumvent the new FFP rules recently put
in place; mainly because Manchester City was facing such large losses in the
years prior.163
In addition to UEFA voicing concern about clubs potentially
sidestepping FFP through the use of related parties, the Council of Europe
(COE) proffered the same concern.164 The COE raised concerns over the
Etihad sponsorship of Manchester city as a way for the club to circumvent
FFP rules.165 Additionally, the COE discussed the idea UEFA should prohibit
clubs from “sponsoring themselves or using associated bodies to do so.” 166
Lastly, the COE raised concerns of sponsors inflating the value of their
sponsorship deal in order to increase revenues of European clubs.167 The
COE went on to deem the sponsorship deal between Etihad and Manchester
City as “improper.”168 However, the COE acts as a watchdog and is separate
from the European Union; they have no power to impose any kind of rules.169
While UEFA eventually sanctioned Manchester City for failing the breakeven analysis,170 UEFA found the sponsorship deal with Etihad to not be a
related party transaction, therefore, the value did not necessitate scrutiny.171
The second deal that caught the attention of UEFA due to a related party

160

Id.
Id.
162 Id.
163 Taylor, supra note 157.
164 EUR. CONSULT. ASS., Good governance and ethics in sports, Doc. No. 12889 4 (2012),
http://semanticpace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncveG1sL1hSZ
WYvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xODA5OSZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0
cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUER
GLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE4MDk5.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See id. at 10. (“There is also a need to monitor the ‘purchases’ of sponsors, who should
not overpay for the rights they acquire.”).
168 Id.
169
Manchester City’s Etihad deal ‘improper’ says Council of Europe, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 7, 2012, 11:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/mar/07/manchestercity-etihad-deal-improper.
170 Man City CFCB agreement, supra note 146, 1.
171 See Manchester City – Roll With It, THE SWISS RAMBLE (Jan. 2, 2015),
http://swissramble.blogspot.com/2015/01/manchester-city-roll-with-it.html.
161
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transaction was PSG’s sponsorship with QTA.172 PSG’s sponsorship deal
with QTA would see €200 million generated annually in sponsorship
revenue, eclipsing any sponsorship revenue earned by their rivals.173 Unlike
the Manchester City sponsorship deal, the CFCB found the sponsorship to
have been a related party transaction.174 Because the CFCB found this
agreement to be a related party transaction, the value assessed by PSG needed
to reflect the fair value. The CFCB found the value of €200 million annually
for the sponsorship was not the “fair value” and thus UEFA needed to
reevaluate the value.175 In reevaluating the value of the sponsorship, the
CFCB found PSG’s revenue did not meet or exceed their expenses and
therefore was in violation of the break-even analysis.176
While the CFCB found both PSG and Manchester City liable for
breaching FFP, specifically the break-even analysis, their punishment mainly
came in the form of monetary damages and heightened supervision.177 What
is not evident in the FFP regulations is whether repeat offenders will face
harsher penalties or if they will continue being admonished in the form of
monetary fines.178 If there is no process to levy harsher punishments against
repeat offenders under FFP, we may see clubs with wealthy foreign
benefactors pricing UEFA’s monetary fines into the cost of doing business.
In the current corporate regulatory environment, it has become commonplace
for companies to price in their violations (also known as an “efficient
breach”).179 The spirit of FFP as well as the stated objectives would be
undercut if clubs are allowed to “efficiently breach” FFP via their owners
paying the fines. If FFP is to not only survive but achieve its stated objectives,
UEFA must make changes in how the regulations are applied to clubs across
Europe.
V. SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF FINANCIAL FAIR
PLAY REGULATIONS
With what appears to be some clubs choosing to eschew UEFA’s FFP
regulations, there needs to be reform to ensure FFP lives on and accomplishes
its stated objectives. By closing some current holes in the regulations, club
172

Ogden, supra note 28.
Id.
174 PSG CFCB agreement, supra note 143, at 2.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Supra Section III.C (discussing the settlement agreements between Manchester City
and PSG with UEFA over their break of FFP).
178
In both the FFP regulations as well the CFCB procedures, information as to how the
CFCB and UEFA will handle repeat offenders is absent. 2015 FFP regulations; Union of Eur.
Football Assocs., PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB FINANCIAL CONTROL
BODY (2015).
179 Cynthia Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76
N.C.L REV. 1265, 1270 (1998).
173
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spending can maintain the rationalism intended by FFP while ensuring
foreign owners are not able to pick winners and losers.
The first issue to address is whether repeat offenders will face harsher
sanctions than monetary fines. Using the law-as-price theory posited by
Professor Williams,180 it would make little sense for clubs to stop breaking
the rules if they are to only face continual monetary fines. Allowing clubs to
price in habitual breaching of the FFP regulations would not only be costly
to the competition in football, it would be costly to the regulatory system put
in place by UEFA.
Let us use the FC Porto sanctions discussed above as an example.181 For
the 2016/2017 season, the CFCB fined FC Porto €2,200,000 for their breach
of FFP regulations. The season prior to this sanction being imposed, FC
Porto’s operational income was roughly €75,000,000.182 The fine imposed by
the CFCB in the settlement comes out to be almost three percent of their
operational income from the previous year. Although the CFCB have other
punishments at their disposal beyond monetary fines, the CFCB adjudication
rules for administering FFP do not require the CFCB to escalate club
punishment for repeat offenders. If, hypothetically, FC Porto wanted to
continue to breach FFP in hopes of securing better players, the sanction
amount is and would continue to be inconsequential to the overall operation
of the club. The CFCB’s fine could easily be offset by additional income
stemming from FC Porto’s continual breach of FFP.
The competitiveness found in the current environment of European
football has placed a higher intrinsic value on on-the-pitch success than
bottom line profitably. This is evident through the myriad of clubs failing to
spend within the boundaries of their income that are reviewed by the CFCB
on a yearly basis. While the number of clubs spending irresponsibly has
reduced in recent years due to FFP, there are still cases every year of clubs
spending outside their means. By allowing clubs to continue to chase top
talent in hopes of greater success on the pitch while eschewing their financial
responsibilities, the goals set out by FFP will never come to fruition. There
is a clear correlation between the amount spent on players and success on the
pitch, as well as a clear correlation between success on the pitch and
increased revenue.183
I proffer, as the first reform to FFP, a new policy be implemented to
ensure repeat offenders are mandatorily given harsher penalties for every
subsequent breach of FFP. UEFA would simply need to update article
180

Id.
Supra Section III.C
182
Futebol Club Do Porto SAD, Management Report & Consolidated Accounts 2015/2016
(2016),
http://www.fcporto.pt/Relatrios%20de%20Contas/RC_Consolidado_20152016_INGLES.pdf.
183 Fiona Carmichael, Ian McHale, & Dennis Thomas, Maintaining Market Position:
Team Performance, Revenue and Wage Expenditure in the English Premier League, 63 BULL.
OF ECON. RES. 464, 480 (2010).
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twenty-nine of Procedural Rules governing the UEFA Club Financial
Control Body regulations or add a subsequent article to indicate harsher
penalties for repeat offenders. To discourage pricing FFP breaches into the
club’s business model, punishment for repeat offenses should not include
monetary fines. The rules governing the CFCB list nine potential disciplinary
measures; the first three disciplinary measures are a warning, reprimand, and
a monetary fine respectively.184 Implementing new regulations that require
repeat offenders to face a minimum punishment starting at the fourth
disciplinary measure, point reduction,185 would not allow clubs to “price in”
in their habitual rule breaking and ensure that actual long lasting change is
introduced to European football by FFP.
When a club is repeatedly unable to manage their finances, additional
financial burdens will not serve as a method to correct their behavior. There
are two potential reasons for a club to breach FFP and spend outside of the
club’s current revenue level. First, the club is facing legitimate financial
burdens and are choosing to spend outside their means in hopes of increasing
revenue through on-the-pitch success. Second, the club has a wealthy owner,
potentially a foreign owner looking to make a previously unsuccessful club
successful, and the bottom line finances of that club mean less to the wealthy
owner than on-the-pitch success. In either of these scenarios, continual fines
for failing to spend within reason is not a punishment that will lead to a more
financially stable club. By diminishing a club’s potential success in the
UEFA competitions through either point reduction or total disbarment from
the competition, clubs will not have to make a choice between financial
stability or on-the-pitch success. The CFCB will make this choice for them
through a policy that eliminates even the chance of on-the-pitch success if
finances are not stable.
In addition to requiring the CFCB to start at harsher penalty than
monetary fines for habitual FFP breaches, I posit an amendment to
punishment 1(g), found in article twenty-nine of the Procedural Rules
Governing the CFCB, which could help curb irresponsible spending by
wealthy foreign owners in hope of securing top talent. Punishment 1(g) states
the CFCB, in finding a club has breached FFP, may impose a “restriction on
the number of players that a club may register for participation in UEFA
competitions, including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the
employee benefit expenses of players registered on the A-list for the purpose
of UEFA club competitions.”186 I recommend adding additional language to
this punishment which would bar clubs from registering any player
purchased in any fiscal year found to be in violation of FFP regulations.
Take for example PSG’s most recent settlement which was discussed
184 Union of European Football Associations, PROC. RULES GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB
FIN. CONTROL BODY art. 29(1) (2015).
185 Id.
186 Id. art. 29(1)(g).
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previously.187 In this settlement, PSG had their available squad for all UEFA
competitions reduced to twenty-one from the standard twenty-five. This
means while PSG may only register twenty-one players, they can register any
twenty-one players on their roster. If PSG is spending outside their means to
acquire top talent, these new players could become part of this twenty-one
players and PSG would choose lesser skilled players to remain unregistered
in UEFA competitions. During the fiscal period that led to PSG being
sanctioned, they purchased three star players for a total €114 million:
Edinson Cavani for €64 million alone,188 and Marquinhos and Lucas Digne
for the remaining €50 million. 189 Had the recommendation posited here been
part of the punishment handed out to PSG in 2014, PSG could not register
these three for the following season.
By restricting clubs from using players that were purchased with funds
that led to a breach of FFP, their investments lost most, if not all, their return.
For example, let us examine PSG again but this time, in the most current
transfer window. In the summer of 2017, PSG purchased Neymar from
Barcelona and Mbappe from AC Monaco for a total €367 million.190 While
the CFCB have not sanctioned PSG for breach of FFP to date, the CFCB is
investigating PSG’s recent spending.191 If the CFCB finds that PSG breached
FFP, more likely than not, PSG will face similar sanctions as they did in 2014
and have their squad reduced from twenty-five to twenty-one. However, if
those twenty-one spots allotted to PSG for UEFA competitions cannot
include either Neymar or Mbappe, PSG’s investment of €367 million will
have little to no return. This change to punishment 1(g) will discourage
wealthy foreign owners from spending large amounts of money on new
players knowing they may not be able to use these new expensive players in
future competitions. By further restricting the players from UEFA
competitions and installing harsher penalties for habitual rule breakers, new
foreign owners may feel less inclined to use their wealth to pick winners and
losers in European football.
Beyond additional regulations to FFP, the term “related party” of the
current regulations need to have a more clear and inclusive definition. In
addition to a better definition to the term, UEFA and the CFCB need to take
a stance that the term will apply in a broader, more liberal way. If the CFCB
187
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adopt a clearer definition of related party, while also interpreting the term in
a broader sense, the CFCB could ensure the spirit of FFP is upheld to the
highest extent possible.
For example, the Etihad sponsorship of Manchester City should fall
under the definition of related party. Yet, the CFCB found these two parties
to have not been related parties. This has allowed Manchester City to receive
large sums of money via sponsorship deals between their club and Etihad
airlines with minimal oversight by UEFA and CFCB. Under FFP, the CFCB
consider two parties to be related if they “are controlled, jointly controlled,
or significantly influenced by the same government.”192 Taking a closer look
at Manchester City and Etihad, it would appear the CFCB means to interpret
the language “significant influence by the same government” extremely
narrowly. One way to combat potential related party transactions from
escaping UEFA scrutiny would be to broaden the interpretation of the related
party regulations found in FFP.
The first solution to the current definition of related parties under FFP
would be to expand the verbiage found in the actual regulations. Under FFP,
one qualifies as a related person if they are a close family member such as a
spouse, child, child of the spouse, or dependent of a key figure of the football
club that has control or significant influence over the football club.193 This
definition of a related person is wanting and leaves many different close
family relationships outside the purview of FFP. The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission(SEC) defines related parties more broadly. The SEC
defines a related person as “Any immediate family member […] which
means any child, stepchild, parent, stepparent, spouse, sibling, mother-inlaw, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-inlaw, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household
of such security holder.”194
The difference between UEFA’s related person definition and the SEC’s
is stark. By aligning the definition of related person closer to what has been
codified by the SEC, UEFA may be able to pull additional transactions under
their jurisdiction and allow for greater oversight of European Football. This
greater oversight would help curb transactions disguised as legitimate
revenue when in actuality they entail equity contributions.
Next, beyond rewriting the actual definition of related parties, UEFA
must take the stance of interpreting FFP regulations in a broader sense. An
example for the need to broaden the interpretation of the regulations is the
previously given transaction between Manchester City and Etihad Airlines.
With one being a member of the royal family of UAE and the other being
owned by the country of UAE, it is confounding how these two parties are
not “significantly influenced by the same government.” This solution does
192
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not require any rewriting of the current FFP regulation. It merely requires the
CFCB to enforce the regulations that are currently on the books.
Even if Manchester City and Etihad could make a compelling argument
that they are not significantly influenced by the same government, it would
appear a member of the royal family of UAE has “significant influence” over
an airline owned by UAE.195 UEFA must set out a clear definition of
“significant influence” and must make that clear definition as broad as
possible. This again would allow additional transactions to fall under the
jurisdiction of UEFA and allow for greater oversight of potentially related
party transactions.
Moreover, related party transactions need to be differentiated between
types of transactions. Looking at related party transaction regulations under
the SEC, different transactions have different regulations pertaining to
related parties.196 Beyond mirroring the language found in the SEC
regulations regarding definitions of related parties, UEFA should also
appropriate the idea of related party regulations regarding specific types of
transactions. Sponsorships are one of the many ways related parties or
potentially related parties are able to funnel money into a football club of
their choosing. A solution to this problem would be to have regulations
regarding club sponsorships and related parties.
As the COE raised, there is a concern over clubs “sponsoring
themselves” through related party sponsorships.197 According to the current
rules of FFP, if a club is to claim revenue from a related party transactions,
including a sponsorship deal, it is the club’s responsibility to determine the
fair market value of the sponsorship deal.198 If UEFA decides to investigate
the claimed fair market value, the CFCB will refer the transaction for
investigation to an independent third party to determine the true fair market
value.199 My recommendation would be to bifurcate related party transactions
that are based on sponsorship transactions and those that are non-sponsorship
transactions. The reason for this bifurcation in the regulations would be to
ensure no European clubs may participate in self-sponsorship.200 My
recommendation is for UEFA to determine the fair market value of related
195 2015 FFP, supra note 20, Annex X (F)(3)(c)(explaining two entities are related parties
when “one entity has significant influence over the other entity”).
196 See 17 C.F.R. 229.404 (discussing related party transactions dealing with indebtedness
and related party transaction dealing with leaseholds and how they are treated differently).
197 Council of Europe, Good governance and ethics in sports, Doc. No. 12889, 10 (2012).
198 2015 FFP, supra note 20, Annex X(B)(k).
199 Id. Annex X(F)(6).
200 See Council of Europe, supra note 197. See also Mike Ozanian, La Liga Says PSG
Using Financial Doping To Get Neymar, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2017, 11:49 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2017/08/03/la-liga-says-psg-using-financialdoping-to-get-neymar/#50dc05cd41ba (discussing PSG holding tenth position in kit
sponsorships but at the same time holding the largest sponsorship of any European club from
their parent company).
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party sponsorship transactions from the beginning of the transaction rather
than allow the club to make the initial valuation.
Requiring UEFA to value sponsorship transactions will deter clubs from
using related party transactions for a few reasons. First, the club will feel less
in control of its sponsorship transactions when it comes to related parties
relative to a third-party sponsorship transaction. A club will feel their
negotiating position has been reduced when ultimately the value will be
determined by UEFA. Second, the related party sponsor will be hesitant to
participate in a related party sponsorship again due to a lack of negotiating
power. A related party sponsor may feel as if they are being forced to pay too
much for the exposure being generated from the sponsorship. A related party
sponsor may feel it could generate a larger exposure for the same price in an
arms-length transaction with a price negotiated by the parties than it could in
a related party transaction where the value is set by UEFA.
Last, requiring UEFA to evaluate the price of a sponsorship transaction
between a club and a related party would add unnecessary time to a
sponsorship transaction. Clubs enter into new sponsorships deals for higher
streams of revenue. If the club requires larger streams of income, it would
prefer the stream of income to start sooner rather than later. By being able to
enter an arms-length negotiated sponsorship sooner than a related party
sponsorship, the club would have another reason to favor non-related party
sponsorships.
As stated previously, the CFCB should treat related party sponsorships
differently than other related party transactions entered into by a club. Other
non-sponsorship related party transactions will continue to be valued by the
club and only investigated if UEFA feels there is a deviation between the true
market value and the value claimed by the club. There are two reason for
bifurcating these two types of related party transactions.
First, as it stands now, self-sponsorship through related parties is one of
the major ways wealthy foreign owners are able to contribute equity to the
club disguising it as legitimate revenue.201 Until other transactions prove to
be just as troublesome, the heightened scrutiny is only warranted with
sponsorship transactions. Second, UEFA would be required to expend large
amounts of time and resources administering this regulation. To require this
level of heightened scrutiny on all possible related party transactions would
become unreasonable and burdensome.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the protection of European football, the FFP regulations needs
amending to ensure winners and losers are no longer chosen by foreign
investments. With the increasing popularity of European football, investment
opportunities have not only increased in number, but increased in value.
201
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Since the 2003/2004 season, Europe has seen an explosion of foreign owners
investing in football clubs. With the increase of additional competition in
European football, clubs have taken it upon themselves to spend at
unsustainable levels in a race to the top. Because of this irresponsible
spending, UEFA decided to introduce the FFP regulations.
UEFA implemented FFP to ensure responsible spending by the clubs as
well as to promote and improve all aspects of the game. However, some
aspects of the game, namely competition, continue to go unimproved. By
closing certain loopholes exploited by the new foreign owners coming into
European football, clubs can enjoy financial stability FFP looks to implement
as well as a competitive sport for the clubs and fans alike. If UEFA addresses
repeat offenders, the method of valuing related party transactions, and more
clearly defines a related party, the sport of European football would be better
off.
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